THE BUSH TRAGEDY
By Jacob Weisberg
DEAD CERTAIN: THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W.
BUSH
By Robert Draper
THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF BUSH
By Craig Unger
“As democracy is perfected, the office represents, more and more closely,
the inner soul of the people. We move toward a lofty ideal. On some great and
glorious day the plain folks of the land will reach their hearts desire at last,
and the White House will be adorned by a downright moron.” - H. L. Mencken
This wasn't supposed to happen.
Not the election of George W. Bush. That was
supposed to happen. It was, after all, what the friends of his father had been
investing in all those long bankrupt years Junior spent drilling for dust
in a failed bid to become a player in the Texas oil "bidness." From
this background, through his richly rewarded stint as . . . what? blue-chip
nameplate? corporate
cheerleader? . . . for the Texas Rangers, to his judicial appointment as 43rd
president of the United States, the biography of Dubya was nothing if not
arranged every step of the way.
What was not supposed to happen was his having
to actually be a president. Coming to office after the peace and
prosperity of the Clinton 90s, all the second Bush would have to do is . . .
well, whatever he was doing on the board of the Texas Rangers. Or less. Rarely
has any individual come to such a position of political power so ignorant and so
ill-prepared, so clueless and inexperienced in virtually all matters
foreign and domestic. But that wasn't supposed to matter. "Being president was something beyond Bush's
capacities in a way he didn't recognize," Jacob Weisberg concludes in his
study of The Bush Tragedy.
"It is something he should never have been given a chance to do." Yes.
But of course at the time it seemed like a job anyone could handle.
As the story later went, Bush was hag-ridden from the beginning both by Oedipal agonies and by what Bob Woodward
in Shadow
described (prophetically) as the "myth of the big-time president." To
borrow a favourite sports metaphor, he wanted to be a president who would "swing for the
fences" in an attempt to radically shape history - an approach to politics
Robert Draper says is "fundamental to who George W. Bush is." But this
only came after 9/11, the event which launched the disastrous presidency that
was never supposed to happen. Contrary to this official line,
the administration's original vision
was distinctly "mini ball." Spending a lot of time golfing, for
example. Watch this drive!
What was supposed to happen was a restoration of "dignity" to the White
House. Education reform. Commissions on energy
policy and Social Security. Tax cuts for the rich, naturally. Even Draper will
allow that it seemed at the time a "timid agenda," the president
himself "accidental, undersized, disinterested" (qualities perhaps
more "fundamental" to who he really was). And then came the great
"opportunity" of 9/11 and the manufactured president had to be
re-invented yet again. Politics hates an emptiness. Crisis revealed a void in
the Oval Office that had to be filled with something. And, as fate would have it, something
was waiting eagerly at hand:
Given his lack of knowledge when it came to foreign policy, his
limited experience as a hands-on executive, and the extraordinary bureaucratic
skills of the neocons, George W. Bush was an exceedingly easy mark. "This
guy was tabula rasa," said a State Department source who later became a
critic of Bush. "He was an empty vessel. He was so ripe for the
plucking."
He, and the country he only nominally led.
Enter the neocons. Or, as they are often designated, the "true
believers," the political "idealists." The labels are nonsense. In fact the neocons
differed little from the foreign policy realists they supposedly supplanted.
They were simply more cynical and aggressive when it came to working the levers of
power. The tag about being believers was part of the media kit, something
even critics like Craig Unger continue to retail:
the most significant "clash of civilizations" today is not between
Islam and the West at all, as the conflict is usually framed, but between
fundamentalists - not just Islamists, but Christian and Orthodox Jewish
fundamentalists as well - and the modern world. In other words, the most
powerful enemies of our modern, humanist post-Enlightenment world may not be
militant Islamists more than an ocean away, but Christian fundamentalists and their
neoconservative allies who have been waging a ferocious war against
"militant secularists," and who finally became influential enough to
install, for the first time, a powerful leader of the Christian Right, George W.
Bush, in the White House.
It has a surface appeal, but doesn't hold up to close analysis. For starters,
how well does it describe the Believer-in-Chief? Not very. Weisberg is good on
the striking banality of Bush's preaching, "zealously proclaiming the
message inside a fortune cookie." Such banality was part of an act:
In personal terms, religious language expressed how Bush thought he
had to appear to the country. . . . He wanted everyone to know that God was
guiding him. But this was a hollow certainty and a hollow confidence. As with
his conversion by Billy Graham and his decision to run for president, this faith
narrative was a conscious autobiographical construction.
Weisberg goes on to opine that to "say that Bush's religious persona is
a calculated projection does not mean it is fraudulent," since "for
practised politicians" calculation and sincerity are often mixed. Perhaps.
But this stretches the meaning of belief. Just as the neocon faith in spreading
democracy, another calculated construction that flies in the face of resounding
evidence to the contrary, requires a similar exercise in cognitive dissonance.
All of which makes writing a Bush biography a bit of a challenge. As if the
now legendary degree of secrecy - the cult of no fingerprints that has ruled the
administration from day one - were not enough, how can one begin to fathom the
soul, much less the mind, of such a total zero? And what would be the point?
George W. Bush has been one of the least personally consequential
presidents in history, insofar as he seems to have had little connection to, and
sometimes little interest in, anything that was going on around him. The
decision to disband the Iraqi military? "Well, the policy was to keep the
army intact. Didn't happen." Apparently there is nothing more to say. When Unger
goes into a detailed discussion (largely drawn from a series that ran in the Washington
Post) of some of Cheney's incredibly secretive bureaucratic machinations to
implement far-reaching legal changes expanding executive authority, at
no point is there any indication that the president knew what was happening. If
he had known, there seems little chance he would have cared enough to understand.
He was, after all, uninterested in details, as well as being (in Draper's
unintentionally devastating phrase) "a man who required comfort and
routine." And he simply wasn't very bright. The dyslexic torturing of the
language isn't the worst of it. Time and again interviews reveal that there's just nothing
there. Draper asks him about his plans for after leaving office and
something about a Freedom Institute is mentioned, an organization that
"really, you know, just kind of imparts knowledge and deals with big
issues." One doesn't take away from this that Bush has trouble expressing
himself. One registers that Bush himself has no clear idea, or perhaps any idea
at all, what he's talking about. And this happens nearly every time he opens his
mouth.
Each of these three political biographies has its strengths and
weaknesses. The Bush Tragedy provides an excellent overview and is
particularly insightful on the relationship between Bush and Cheney, but is
hampered by too heavy a reliance on family psychology and a strained analogy to Shakespeare's history plays. The
lightweight character of George W. Bush can't
bear the weight of such analysis. One begins Robert Draper's Dead Certain
expecting a hatchet job as Dubya is observed at unpleasantly close range chawing
a low-fat hot dog. But more often than not Draper is prepared to give the benefit of
the doubt and not look too deeply into matters. He takes at face value
the story of Bush's transforming walk with Billy Graham (an account both
Weisberg and Unger discredit). He describes Saddam Hussein as "booting
out" weapons inspectors (he didn't, they left), and, incredibly, as someone
"spoiling for a fight." He credits Condoleeza Rice with the line about
the smoking gun for Iraqi WMDs coming in the form of a mushroom cloud. One expects
better attention to detail, even in a book as timely as
this.
There are, however, some choice bits. The wonderful Bushisms, for starters.
After 9/11 we hear the commander-in-chief boldly declare that "this ass is going back to
Washington." More inadvertent candor can be found in his expressed
desire to put the Iraqi people "in a position to kind of be free."
Which must be kind of like wanting to spread democracy. Perhaps the biggest
revelation though is how
seriously Bush takes the business of working out: religiously jogging, biking,
or lifting weights one to two hours a day, six days a week. Some readers
may find all of the
accompanying jock-talk, and the nagging suspicion that there might have
been something more important to occupy his time, a bit
troubling.
Craig Unger's The Fall of the House of Bush is more contextual, in
particular examining the rising influence of fundamentalism in American
politics. He is also good on the many failures of the media, like their
inability to understand "dog whistle politics" (whereby coded messages
were sent to the religious right in the guise of campaign rhetoric that on its
face appeared bland and innocuous). As critical as all of these authors are,
however, there are a pair of larger questions that I would have liked them to
address: Is it better to be a consequential president, even if those consequences are
disastrous, than one who simply manages to steer the ship of state with dull
competence? Can one be a great president without starting a war?
Sadly
these are not rhetorical questions at all, and the answers provided, at least by
the cheerleading media over the past eight years, have been Yes in
the first instance and No in the second. Bush himself came to believe all the
hype -
that to be a great president it was necessary to be a commander-in-chief, that
it was better to strike out in spectacular style while swinging for the fences
than to play small ball. The results were catastrophic. And not only because
of what happened in Iraq, a situation that may still be resolved to the benefit
of the United States. The real, abiding legacy of George W. Bush will likely consist of less
media-sexy items, a
long list topped by his complete failure to provide any leadership whatsoever on environmental
issues, his ballooning of the national debt, and his (or more accurately his
vice-president's) refashioning of an "imperial" presidency. For all of
this America will pay a terrible price.
Notes:
Review first published online March 24, 2008. With regard to the smoking gun/mushroom cloud line, the actual provenance
of that gem of propaganda, employed by Bush as well as Rice, is murky: Apparently Rice lifted
the line from a September 8, 2002 New York Times story - byline Michael Gordon and Judith
Miller - which is where it first appeared in
public, though it had in fact been planted by the White House. According to
Isikoff and Corn in Hubris it had initially been conceived by Bush's chief speechwriter
Michael Gerson.
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