I.O. U.
By John Lanchester
If reports are to be believed, and the subprime mortgage meltdown of 2008 (to
give it just one of its names) really was the herald of the Worst Economic
Crisis Since the Great Depression, then we might expect to read many more
accounts in coming days of what went wrong. There have been plenty of books on
the subject already, insider's tales, journalistic takes, and even a quick
release by heavyweight Richard Posner (A Failure of Capitalism), but so
far John Lanchester's I.O.U. stands out, if not for its perceptiveness
and insight, then at least for the quality of its writing. A well-known novelist
(I reviewed Mr.
Phillips several years ago) and non-economist, Lanchester tells the
story from a layman's perspective for other laymen. This is important because,
as he puts it, there is a "gap between the world of finance and that of the
general public and . . . there is a need to narrow that gap, if the financial
industry is not to be a kind of priesthood, administering to its own mysteries
and feared and resented by the rest of us."
The short answer to the question of what went wrong is: Everything that could
have. A culture of greed, a political climate of permissiveness, worthless
mathematical models of risk, a skewed system of incentives - they all played
their part. Catastrophic failure was, in turn, what we should have expected
based on the operation of Murphy's Law. Complex systems have a way of breaking
down, with the likelihood of breakdown increasing with their complexity. The
subprime mortgage market was a very complex system, much of it deliberately
opaque and incomprehensible even to its inventors. Acronyms like CDS (credit
default swaps) and CDO (collateralized debt obligations) were only part of it.
The entire system was divorced from reality, having been devised to run like a
computer program. (Which is, in fact, the way a lot of stock trading is done
these days. Humans have even taken to trying to imitate such theoretical purity
in adopting methods of "technical analysis" when building their own
portfolios. But that's another story, and one Lanchester doesn't get into.)
What got the whole mess started, according to Lanchester, was the collapse
of communism and the subsequent two decades of capitalism's "victory party."
With its great enemy vanquished, liberal democracies didn't even have to pay lip
service to questions of how to provide better lives for ordinary people. The "jet engine was unhooked from the oxcart [of social justice] and
allowed to roar off at its own speed." Which made a lot of people rich,
just as it was supposed to.
That said, I had a saddening, double-barreled response to Lanchester's
comment that there were "two big things wrong" with the post-Cold War
boom: "it wasn't fair and it wasn't sustainable." My first response
was that anyone today who thinks that life, at any level, is even supposed
to be fair is either (a) under the age of eighteen; or (b) mad. That ideological
battle was lost a long time ago. But what I found discouraging, upon further
reflection, is that the same could probably be said for anyone who thinks that
there is anything sustainable about Western, industrial, modern civilization.
It's not just that capitalism is a system that may be expected to go boom and
bust. It's that we know we can't possibly go on like this, and that we probably
couldn't change course now even if we wanted to.
Lanchester ends the book with James Lovelock's comment that what the world
needs is the equivalent of a "small heart attack" to shock us all into
more responsible, environmentally sustainable lifestyles. So far that hasn't
happened, leaving us in the frog-in-the-cooking-pot scenario. The credit crisis,
Lanchester thinks, was "capitalism's equivalent [of the small heart
attack]. . . . the point at which we all have a chance to take a look at
ourselves, our banking systems, and our politicians and make some changes."
We haven't, and I agree with Lanchester's dismal assessment that such a
reappraisal will probably never happen. Small heart attacks won't be enough.
Sometime, rather sooner than later I suspect, we're going to have to deal with
the Big One.
Notes:
Review first published February 22, 2003. Throughout the book Lanchester holds Canada's banking system up as a
better alternative to the British and American models. It's hard to take much pride or
comfort in this, however, seeing as our stricter regulations were only the
result of a historical accident and in the case of any further collapse we would have
certainly gone down along with everyone else.
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